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Draft Recommendation
on WEU's role in the organisation of European secuity after the decisions taken by the
European Union in Amsterdam and by NATO in Madid
The Assembly,
(t) Considering that the Treaty of Amsterdam has ruled out:
(a) the prospect of an immediate or early realisation of a common defence policy or a
common defence within the European Union,
(b) plans for the immediate or early integration of WEU with the European Union,
but is in favour of closer cooperation between both organisations, in particular in cases when
the European Union avails itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of
the Union with defence implications;
(ii) Stressing that the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty and
the fact of entrusting of WEU with additional tasks, such as providing the European Union
with access to operational capability, supporting it in framing the defence aspects of its
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and providing WEU personnel for the European
Union's policy planning and early warning unit make formal uurangements between both
organisations a matter of urgency;
(iii) Noting that as yet there have only been occasional informal contacts between WEU and
the relevant European Union bodies,
(i, Fearing that the difficulties that the European Union has experienced so far in reaching
common decisions and in reacting quickly to a particular security crisis (for example in the
Balkans) will be aggravated by the extreme complexity of the draft procedure which has been
framed for EUAMEU operations under Article J 7 3 of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
(") Stressing, therefore, the need to simplify these procedures and for WEU to continue to
make full use of its own powers of decision both under Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels
Treaty and in accordance wirh the Petersberg Declaration;
(tr) Concerned that the specific reference in the Amsterdam Treaty to the dominant role of
NATO, which is where certain member states of the Union see a common defence being
realised, should not be construed by the public at large as an indication that the common
European defence project is being abandoned;
(vii) Welcoming the fact therefore that the Amsterdam Treaty reaffirms that its provisions
shall not constitute an impediment to the development of closer cooperation between member
states in the framework of WEU, on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty, which is still the
only basis in international law for the establishment of a common European defence;
(virr) Welcoming also the Declaration of the WEU Council of 22 July 1997 confirming its
determination to retain the autonomous decision-making capability conferred on it by the
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modified Brussels Treaty and to develop its role as the European military body for crisis
management;
(ix) Noting that at their Madrid summit meeting held in July 1997 the heads of state and of
government of the Atlantic Alliance member countries reiterated their resolve to build a
European security and defence identity (ESDD within NATO, but stressing that without WEU
there will be no such identity;
(x) Considering that substantital impetus might be provided by increasing the number of
options available to WEU, including the option approved by the Foreign Affairs and Defence
Ministers in Paris on l3 May 1997 (paragraph 22 of the Paris Declaration);
(xl Recalling however that ESDI can only become a political and military reality if there is
consensus that it is to be achieved by common European political will and expressed tkough
WEU where all the European members of NATO and European Union member countries are
represented;
(xil Emphasising the need to decide on the consequences for WEU of the different ways in
which NATO and the European Union proceed with their enlargement policy;
(xiii) Convinced that the current situation created by the Amsterdam Treaty and NATO
decisions in Brussels, Berlin and Madrid make examination of whether, and to what extent,
revision of the modifieo Brusscls'l'reaty is required a matter of urgency;
(xiv) Concerned that the legal basis for participation by the associate and observer countries
in WEU's activities, and particularly in the area of armaments cooperation, needs clarification;
(xu) Concerned also that public opinion in Europe seems ever more confused about how
security and defence responsibilities are apportioned and increasingly unaware of Europe's
requirements in this area;
(xul Stressing the need to make substantially more financial resources available to WEU to
enable it to cope with its new responsibilities;
(xvii) Stresiing also the need to develop WEU's military structures and to define the remit
and composition of the Military Committee in line with WEU's new responsibilities vis-i,-vis
the European Union and NATO;
(xviii) Recalling the need to develop a procedure for carrying out operations whereby WEU
can take charge of the deployment of an armed force in which not all member countries take
part;
(xix) Convinced that obtaining the public support necessary for the many decisions that face
WEU demands the involvement at the highest level of political and government representatives
of its member countries;
(o) Recalling paragraph l3 of Assembly Recommendation 556 and the Council's reply to
that Recommendation,
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
l. Establish WEU as the caucus in which the European cornrnon political will required to
make ESDI a political and military reality is to be achieved and expressed, and take concrete
steps to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union;
2. For its next ministerial meeting prepare:
(a) a draft agreement, to be ratified by the relevant authorities of the countries
concerned, with a view to providing a sound legal basis for full participation in WEU's
activities, under the terms of the Amsterdam Treaty and the new relationship between
WEU and NATO, by those associate and observer countries which at the moment cannot
or will not accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
ft) an opinion on whether, and to what e)ftent, certain provisions of the modified
Brussels Treaty might need to be revised or adjusted in the light of WEU's new
responsibilities vis-i-vis the European Union and NATO;
(c) a conceptual approach to WEU's enlargement policy, to replace WEU Declaration II
of December l99l appended to the Maastricht Treaty, which seeks to achieve maximum
congruence within the "WEU family", particularly in regard to enhanced relations with
the associate partner countries;
(d) a concerted policy on relations with Russia and Ukaine;
(e) a proposal on a substantial increase in the financial resources to be made available to
WEU to enable it to cope with its new responsibilities;
3. Establish close consultations as a matter of urgency with the relevant institutions of the
European Union to define the scope of future cooperation between both organisations;
4. Carry out its resolve, as stated in its Declaration of 72luly 1997, to avail itself fully of
the autonomous decision-making capability conferred on it by all relevant provisions of the
modified Bnrssels Treaty;
5. Give practical effect to the intention it has pre',.iously expressed of supporting the United
Nations and OSCE in their crisis-management tasks;
6. Complete the development of the operational capabilities of WEU and of all its
subsidiary bodies;
7 . Convene a Council meeting at head of state and of government level on the occasion of
the fiftieth anniversary of the Brussels Treaty, in order to ratify, among other things, the
political decisions set out in this Recommendation.
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kplanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Blaauw, Wce-Chairman and Rapporteur)
l. When MrHoyer, German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Germany's
negotiator at the intergovernmental conference, briefed the Presidential, Defence and Political
Committees of the WEU Assembly on l9 June 1997 on the results of the Amsterdam summit
meeting, he remarked among other things that the prospect of a common European defence
remained open. However, he added that nothing further was envisaged for the present.
2. Mr de Puig, President of the Assembly, therefore reminded member governments in his
declaration to the press on 27 lune 1997 that there is still much to be done to show our
peoples that our nations have not abandoned the European defence project and that they stand
firm in their determination to develop the means by which that project can be achieved. This
will be a difficult task bearing in mind that, as the result of the intergovernmental conference
on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty showed, opinions remain divided on the nature, the
configuration and the political and geographical range of the project. We know now that the
Treaty of Amsterdam makes no concrete provision for a common defence policy, a common
defence or WEU's integration in the European Union in the immediate future or in the
relatively short term. It merely provides for eirhar,ced cooperation between both organisations,
the detailed arrangements of which still have to be worked out between them.
3. At their Madrid summit meeting on 8 July 1997 however, NATO member countries
reaffirmed their determination, first expressed in January 1994 in Brussels and again in the
Berlin Declaration of 3 June 1996, to build and support a European security and defence
identity (ESDI) within NATO. Furthermore, they recognised once again that WEU constitutes
an essential element of the development of this identity. However, none of the three
aforementioned texts defines what exactly is meant by the ESDI. Does it mean the same as
"common defence", "common defence policy" or the "CFSP" 
- 
terms used in the Treaty of
Amsterdam? Who is or represents the ESDI and who takes the necessary decisions on its
behalf? Who belongs to the ESDI and who has a voice in it?
4. Does the ESDI mean NATO itself or its 14 European membcr countries? Is it WEU in
its configuration of 10, 13, 18 or 28? Or is it the European Council of the European Union
which, according to the new Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, has competence to establish
general guidelines in respect of WEU for those matters regarding which the Union avails itself
of WEU, and.takes the final decision on whether and when the common foreign and security
policy (CFSP) is to lead to a common defence? For the Atlantic Alliance, the problem mainly
seems to be one of its internal structural adaptation process.
5. However, ensuring that the ESDI becomes a political reality as soon as possible is first
and foremost a challenge for WEU, which is recognised as being one of its essential elements.
Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam has confirmed WEU's role as an integral part of the
development of the European Union and has conferred upon it responsibility for providing the
Union with access to an operational capability. WEU is to support the European Union in
framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy.
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6. In its Declaration of 22 luly 1997, which is to be appended to the Amsterdam Treaty, the
WEU Council confirms that WEU will continue to have as its basis the modified Brussels
Treaty, which implies that the WEU Council will retain its independent decision-making
powers for the purpose of implementing that Treaty. At the same time, the Council reaffirmed
the aim "to build up WEU as the defence component of the European Union" and to act as an
essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Atlantic Alliance.
7. In addition, WEU declared its willingness to act in accordance with the guidelines set by
the European Council in all cases where the European Union avails itself of WEU to elaborate
and implement decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications,
in particular in the area of "Petersberg" missions, upon which the European Union can now
also decide.
8. The WEU Declaration mentions a number of decisions to be taken in order to comply
with the relevant Amsterdam Treaty provisions: the Organisation must develop the role of the
observer countries within it and adopt the necessary arrangements so that all European Union
member states contributing to tasks undertaken by WEU at the request of the European Union
can participate fully and on an equal footing in the planning and decision-making process in
WEU. WEU has to draw up, together with the European Union, arrangements for enhanced
cooperation between both organisations, within a year from the entry into force of the
Amsterdam provisions. It is of special importance in this conten to make sure that WEU
personnei participate fully in the new poiicy planning and edrly waning unit to be set up by the
European Union and that WEU can make suggestions to that unit for.work to be undertaken.
9. New arrangements for the development of WEU's Planning Cell, Situation Centre and
Satellite Centre, as well as of WEAG in view of the establishment of a European armaments
agency, have to be drawn up and implemented.
10. As an essential element of the development of the European security and defence identity
(ESDI) within the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is to continue to strengthen institutional and
practical cooperation with NATO, particularly in the context of crisis management. In the same
context it will develop its own operational role and in particular define the role and
composition of the newly created Military Committee. It will draw up the necessary
arrangements with the United Nations and the OSCE in order to support them in their crisis-
management tasks. In so doing, WEU will have to come to an arrangement with its associate
member, observer and associate partner countries as to how their participation in WEU's
activities can be further enhanced.
I l. However, the most important challenges with which WEU is now confronted are not
addressed in the WEU Declaration of ZTluly 1997. One of them is the problem of how to
achieve an ESDI with a true political content based on a firm legal foundation.
12. The ESDI can only become a reality if there is European consensus and coherence in
security and defence issues. Amsterdam has shown that such a consensus will not be reached in
the European Union in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, even if there is a consensus in
NATO to build the ESDI within the Atlantic Alliar:.ce, NATO can only help by providing the
necessary structures. The political expression of the ESDI however has to be developed in and
around WEU as its recognised essential component. Why WEU?
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13. The Council provides the answer in its aforementioned Declaration when it observes that
the WEU Council:
"today brings together all the Member States of the European Union and all the
European Members of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with their respective statuses.
The Council also brings together those States with the Central and Eastern European
States linked to the European Union by an Association Agreement and that are
applicants for accession to both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. WEU is
thus establishing itself as a genuine framework for dialogue and cooperation among
Europeans on wider European security and defence issues."
However, dialogue and cooperation alone will not be sufficient. The time has come to take
decisions.
14. WEU can fulfil this fundamental task only if it strenghens its internal coherence and
founds its relationship with the various categories of associate countries, which have not
signed the modified Brussels Treaty, on more solid political and legal grounds. In order to
strengthen this coherence, WEU should first examine whether there is now a case in the new
situation for increasing the number of countries belonging to the "WEU family" that could be
invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty in accordance with Article )O. As long as the
conditions for full membership of Western European Union are not met by all the European
countries participating in WEU's activities with varying statuses, it will not be possible for
them to participate fully and on an equal footing in the planning and decision-making process
in WEU, unless that process is based on formal international agreements duly ratified by the
competent parliamentary institutions of member countries. The "practical arrangements"
refened to in the WEU Declaration of 22luly 1997 are insufficient.
15 As things stand, the legal foundation for participation by the associate and observer
countries in WEU's activities is so weak that its legitimacy can easily be contested. This
situation could affect the activities of the Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Assembly. A
concrete example of such legal deficiency is granting the newly created Western European
Armaments Organisation (WEAO) the status of a subsidiary body of WEU on the basis of
Article VIII.2 of the modified Brussels Treary, despite the fact that three WEAO members
have not signed the Treaty, nor the Agreement on the Status of Western European Union,
National Representatives and lnternationd Staff signed in Paris on I I May 1955. The replies
given by the Council to Written Questions 344 and 345r put by Mr De Decker in this
connection serve to confirm these legal inadequacies.
16. A possible solution to such problems might lie in the adaptation of the modified Brussels
Treaty to the new situation. The July 1997 Declaration confirms WEU's determination to ,
develop its own role as the European politico-military body for crisis management and states
that the Organisation will also support the United Nations and the OSCE in their crisis-
management talks.
17 The Declaration affirms that in addition to its support for the corrlmon defence enshrined
in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, "\-r/EIJ takes an active role in conJlict prevention
and crisis management as provided for in the Petersberg Declaration". This political
determination implies that the WEU Council must retain its independent decision-making
I See Document A,TWEU/DG [97] 20,4 September 1997.
DOCUMENT I58I
powers for the purpose of implementing the modified Brussels Treaty. In order to decide
whether it needs to act in the area of crisis management, WEU cannot rely exclusively on a
political request from the European Union. It will therefore be necessary to make full use of
Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty.
18. The wording of this article might be tightened to include the essential elements of the
Petersberg Declaration and make explicit reference to the possibility of WEU's agreed
determination to support the United Nations and the OSCE in crisis management becoming a
formal treaty obligation. Furthermore, in view of the change in the nature of WEU's
cooperaiion with NATO, the wording of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty might also
be reexamined.
19. The Assembly had already previously envisaged the need for the modified Brussels
Treaty to be revised and had submitted recommendations to this effect in 1990
(Recommendations 490 and 491) and l99l (Recommendation 50a). The Council felt at that
juncture that the time was not ripe for any such revision. Since then several countries have
taken the view that WEU's possible merger with the European Union would in itself lead to a
review of the Treaty and that this should not be undertaken within WEU's existing framework.
20. It became clear from the Amsterdam summit that the projected merger would not take
place within the next few years. However the machinery set up by the modified Brussels
Treaty and its associated agreements is hardly in tune with the reality of oresent-day Europe.
The fact that only l0 of WEU's 28 participant nations have signed the Treaty is ample proof of
this.
21. The argument that any challenge to the Treaty and Article V thereof would be dangerous
to Europe's security certainly deserves ample consideration. But the involvement in WEU's
activities of countries not party to the Treaty has opened up a gap between the law and reality
that continues to widen. In order to bridge that gap, it is possible to contemplate concluding
an agreement that would place a real commitment on countries involved in WEU's activities to
move towards a corrrmon security policy without their necessarily having to accede to the
modified Brussels Treaty. Such an agreement would need to be ratified by the relevant
authorities in the countries concerned.
22. Any such agreement should cover the following:
establishment of a European security policy in conjunction with the European
Union. In this respect it is of particular importance to give all WEU associate
countries which are applicants for membership to the European Union but which do
not yet fulfil all the necessary criteria laid down by it for joining the first pillar, the
opportunity to participate as fully as possible in the framework of the second pillar,
particularly in the European Union's common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
and the relevant structures and institutions. Such a procedure could considerably
enhance cooperation between WEU and the European Union in establishing a joint
policy without waiting until the complex enlargement process of the European
Union has run its course;
clarification of the rights and prerogatives of associate members, observers,
associate partners and WEAO members in each WEU structure so as to ensure that
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in the areas of their involvement in WEU's activities they are, to all intents and
purposes, on an equal footing with member countries;
total or partial extension of the I I May 1955 Agreement to those countries,
obligations of WEU participating countries as regards the military measures some of
them may take in the framework of the Petersberg tasks;
obligations towards NATO of countries participating in WEU activities.
23. A procedure needs to be developed for carrying out operations whereby WEU bodies
can take charge of deployment of an armed force in which not all member countries take part
or where non-member countries may be involved. It should be recalled that any operation
according to this model is covered fully by Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty.
24. Resources, in particular financial resources, made available to WEU by the member,
associate member, observer and associate partner countries should be substantially increased to
enable the Organisation to cope with its new responsibilities, and costs shared proportionately
to the use made of each WEU body by the countries concerned.
25. The general public in Europe appears to be increasingly unaware of Europe's security
and defence requirements and this has led to a substantial fall in defence spending in practically
all European countries in recent years. This development is beginning to take its toll on their
armed forces capability which looks set to decline further over the next few years.
?6 Cutbacks of this kind threaten to force Europe inetrievably into dependency on external
powers that have had the foresight to build up their defence resources to levels that are
essential in view of developments in modern technology.
27 Last but not least, the problem of WEU's enlargement has to be examined in a new
light. In Madrid, NATO invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all three being WEU
associate partner countries, to become full members of the Alliance. At the same time, it
reaffirmed that NATO remains open to new members and that no European democratic
country, regardless of its geographic location, that expressed an interest in becoming a NATO
member would be excluded from consideration. NATO's enlargement process is to be
reviewed in 1999 with particular regard to Romania and Slovenia.
28. In another context, on 15 lulyl997 the European Commission proposed to the
European Union that it start negotiations for the admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia to the European Union. A decision on this proposal is to be
taken at the next EU summit meeting, which is to be held in Luxembourg in November. This
decision will however be complicated by several new developments: first, a group of three
countries 
- 
Belgium, France and Italy 
- 
has taken an initiative with a view to completing the
internal institutional reform of the European Union before beginning the enlargement process.
This idea has been rejected in particular by the German Government. On the other hand,
Germany and the Netherlands, as firm supporters of the European Union opening up to central
European countries, strongly advocate a revision of the financial rules of the Union and have
both indicated that they wish to reduce considerably the amount of their financial contributions
to the EU's budget. This new attitude may have consequences for the position to be adopted
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by those member countries which benefit most from the European Union budget, as regards
the Union's enlargement towards central and eastern Europe.
29. In any case, WEU's enlargement policy is bound to be affected by the processes of
enlargement in NATO and the European Union between which there is no real parallelism at
the moment. The programme of the German WEU Presidency envisages a further deepening of
the involvement of the associate partner countries, particularly in WEU's military cooperation
activities. According to the WEU Declaration of 22 July 1997, WEU will examine how to
strengthen the associate partners' participation in an increasing number of activities.
30. However, it would appear to be essential for WEU to review its enlargement policy as a
whole, as the Assembly has already proposed in a number of its recommendations. At the
moment, the three central European countries invited to become members of both NATO and
the European Union have good prospects of becoming full members of WEU as well.
3 L To the extent that WEU is to be considered as an essential component of the European
security and defence identity (ESDI) within NATO, it will have to take a political decision on
which countries are to be fully part of that identity on an equal footing. The new article J.7 of
the Amsterdam Treaty stipulates that the policy of the European Union "shall respect the
obligations of certain member states, which see their common defence realised in NATO,
under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence
policv established within that framework".
32. The new situation requires, in particular, a review of the role of the associate member
countries and of the observer countries. As member countries of NATO, Denmark, Iceland,
Norway and Turkey played a part in the Alliance's decision to create the CJTF process and to
invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to join NATO. They thus paved the way for
these central European countries to become full members of WEU, once members of the
European Union.
33 . In this connection, it is useful to recall the text of Declaration II (December l99l ) by the
WEU member countries, which is appended to the Maastricht Treaty and states:
"The member states of WEU welcome the development of the European security and
defence identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as the
defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other
European states on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this
spirit, they propose the following:
'States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on
conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article K of the modified Brussels Treaty, or
to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of
NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them
the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.' ..."
34 But the question is whether the l99l WEU Declaration has now been overtaken by the
Treaty of Amsterdam and whether the WEU Declaration of 22 luly 1997 is intended to replace
it entirely. If this is so, it has to be noted that the latter says nothing about the criteria for WEU




35. Is it necessary to define new criteria? The problem is strongly linked with the question of
what the creation of a European security and defence identity (ESDD means. Although no
official definition exists, Anthony Cragg, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for defence
planning and operations recently described it as follows in an article in the NATO Review2:
"A major element of the transformation of the Alliance has been the steady strengthening
of its links with WEU and the search for practical means to enable NATO to support
WEU-led operations in the fields defined in the WEU's June 1992 Petersberg
Declaration, such as conflict prevention, crisis-management and humanitarian operations.
At the same time, the European allies have underlined their commitment to strengthening
the effectiveness of the contribution which they bring to the Alliance as an expression of
shared responsibilities and in order to strengthen the transatlantic link. ESDI is,
therefore, being developed within NATO to enable the European allies to support a
WEU-led operation by drawing, with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council, on
NATO's command structures, planning capability and military assets...".
36. If ESDI is to be understood in this limited sense, the WEU Council seems to have
already taken the necessary steps in order to implement the ESDI project as a part of NATO's
internal adaptation: WEU agreed in April 1997 that all European NATO members which have
not signed the modified Brussels Treaty (Norway, Iceland and Turkey as WEU associate
member countries and Denmark as a WEU observer country) can participate fully in WEU's
Cecision-making process where WEU mounts an operation using NATO's operationai sssets ic
which the aforementioned countries will be contributing.
37 But how will they take part in missions carried out by WEU if WEU decides not to use
NATO's operational assets but only those assets made available to it by WEU countries? Two
scenarios are possible in this context: either WEU acts at the request of the European Union in
which the associate member countries have no voice, or WEU decides to act on its own behalf.
In both cases the associate member countries have only a limited voice in the decision-making
process in WEU even if they wish to participate in the operation.
38. With regard to the future role of European Union member states which have chosen
observer status in WEU and do not belong to NATO, the situation is quite different.
Accordingto'Article 1.7 oftheAmsterdamTreatyandtheWEUDeclaration of 22July1997,
they will be able to participate fully in Petersberg missions organised by WEU at the request of
the European Union and, if they contribute to the relevant missions, they can also participate
fully and on an equal footing in the planning and decision-making process within WEU. If the
mission is to be carried out without using NATO assets, the observer countries consequently
have a better position in WEU than the associate member countries.
39. If the operation is to be carried out with the support of NATO's operational assets, the
observer countries in WEU have the same rights of participation in the WEU decision-muking
process as the associate member countries. In such cases however, NATO has to make specific
arrangements with the relevant observer countries. Recourse to WEU by the European Union
may still give rise to reservations within NATO, in particular on the part of the United States
ll
2 |'\ATO Revtew No. 4, July-August 1997, page 34.
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which might feel uncomfortable about WEU being given instructions by a European Council
including countries that are not in NATO and are neutral3.
40. Regarding the future role of the central European countries that are WEU associate
partners, WEU is again faced with the challenge of taking a decision on the consequences for
its own enlargement policy of the incoherence between NATO and European Union
enlargement. In this context WEU has to consider many new elements:
the number of candidates for membership of NATO and European Union is not
congruent with those countries which have a status of associate partnership in
WEUA;
NATO has decided to proceed with enlargement in waves although it underlines
that every candidate is examined on its own merits;
the European Union will decide in November on the first wave of its enlargement
process;
the criteria for NATO and European Union enlargement are different,
NATO has created a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which is to
replace the former North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). It is composed of
44 counrries, including l6 NATO member countries, l0 WEU associate partner
countries, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 4 neutral countries
- 
Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland (which had only observer status in the
former NACC) 
- 
and 12 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS);
NATO has also created an enhanced Partnership for Peace programme with the
same membership as the EAPC;
on 27 May 1997, a Founding Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security
between NATO and Russia was signed. However, the nature of the future
relationship between NATO and Russia is far from clear. Even though Russia itself
has not yet established its definitive approach, it is interesting to note that from the
outset even Russian membership of NATC has never been excluded by the Alliance;
on 9 July 1997, a Charter of distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine
was signed at the Alliance's Madrid summit meeting;
both NATO and the European Union have initiated a Mediterranean dialogue based
on different and non-harmonised criteria. The role of WEU in this context remains
marginal.
3 See the discussion at the Semrnar organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studres on 2l-22 April 1997 on
"CJTFs" 
- 
a hfeline for a European defence policy?"
o There are 12 candidates for NATO membership: the l0 WEU associate partner countries plus A.lbarua and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Applicants for European Union membership are the l0 WEU
associate partner countries plus Turkey and Cyprus.
t2
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41. Will it now be necessary for WEU to divide the l0 associate partner countries into
different groups and categories? What are WEU's criteria for its enlargement to central
Europe? They cannot simply be those of NATO or those applied by the European Union.
WEU provides the link between NATO and the European Union and should adopt a policy
which ensures maximum coherence within the "WEU family", in particular regarding its future
relations with the central European countries. This requires important and difficult political
decisions. Furthermore, WEU has to take a political decision on how and on what basis it will
establish its future relations with Russia, Ukraine and other member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
42. Allthese new developments demonstrate that WEU has to take decisions on new criteria
for its enlargement policy. This question cannot be reduced to purely technical and structural
adaptation measures as the WEU Council and its member governments seem to have envisaged
so far. It is a highly political problem which must be settled at the highest political level.
43. The number of important issues involved in developing a European security system,
combined with the need for wide public support, require our political leaders to take the
appropriate action. A Council meeting at head of state and of government level would provide
a spectacular demonstration of the determination to achieve it, and the fiftieth anniversary of
the modified Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1998, which the Council itself has earmarked for
WEU's take-ofl could provide the occasion.
44. This is an ambitious enough prograrnme and one whose preparation is sufficiently
advanced for its solemn adoption by WEU member states. Such an event would provide an
opportunity to inform the wider public about the implications of a security and defence policy
for Europe in the scenario that has emerged as a result of the disappearance of the Warsaw
Pact. The solemnity which marks a meeting of heads of state and of government would be the
most appropriate way of attracting hedia attention and nations' interest in this endeavour for
which there has to be widespread support if it is to succeed in a Europe where the cement that
binds the continent as a whole is essentially the practice of democracy.
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